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In the long run-- over the past four decades--improvements in food security in Indonesia 
have generally been driven by pro-poor economic growth and a successful Green 
Revolution, led by high-yielding rice varieties, massive investments in rural 
infrastructure, including irrigation, and ready availability of fertilizer.  In the short run, 
food security in the country has been intimately connected to rice prices.  After more 
than two decades of stabilizing domestic rice prices around the long-run trend of prices 
in the world market, Indonesia emerged from the devastating financial crisis in 1998 
with domestic rice prices much higher than world prices and much higher than long-run 
trends of real prices in rupiahs.  Although the current political rhetoric pushing for even 
higher prices uses food security as the rationale (i.e., they will cause greater self-
sufficiency in rice), in fact few productivity gains are now available to rice farmers, so 
their gains will be consumers’ loses.  High rice prices have a major impact on the 
number of individuals living below the poverty line and on the quality of their diet.   
 
The paper reviews research on the impact of rice prices on the poor, on real wages in 
rural and urban areas, and on the broader macroeconomic consequences for 
investments in labor-intensive manufacturing.  Discussion then focuses on how political 
and economic circumstances have changed since price stabilization, implemented by 
the national food agency (Bulog), balanced the needs of producers and consumers as 
Indonesia’s approach to food security. The most important current challenge for the 
country’s future food security is re-starting rapid, pro-poor growth.  An additional 
challenge on the horizon is the “supermarket revolution,” which is rapidly changing the 
basic structure of Indonesia’s food marketing system.  Within a decade well over half of 
Indonesia’s rice is likely to be sold in supermarkets, thus transferring to the private 
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  Judging the prospects for Indonesia’s food security a decade or more from now requires 
judgments on three important, and larger, issues:  (1) how will Indonesia be governed (i.e. the 
quality of governance); (2) how will the economy respond to that governance (i.e. how “pro-
poor” will economic growth be); and (3) what will happen to the world rice market?  If we had a 
reasonably clear sense of what the outcomes would be in these three areas, it would be relatively 
straightforward to understand the likely outcomes for the country’s food security. 
 
  That is actually an important conclusion.  At the level of development that Indonesia has 
reached, food security is embedded in a broader set of political, economic and technological 
forces.  As a consequence, food security needs little specific policy attention, beyond a concern 
for coping with the chronically poor populations that market forces tend to leave behind.  Thus, a 
decade from now, Indonesia’s food security will depend primarily on the rate and distribution of 
economic growth and targeted programs to alleviate poverty.  Of course, some of these programs 
may well be food-oriented, because the most basic need of the poor is for food. 
 
  Will there be a further need to consider the “food” dimensions of this broader concern for 
social security, whether the food is from the domestic agricultural sector or from the world 
market?  Food security is always an emotional issue, as chronic hunger, local food shortages, and 
sudden spikes in food prices all mobilize public sentiment to “do something.”  “Food security” is 
the vague but still emotionally powerful concept of what the public wants with respect to these 
problems.  However defined, food security is clearly a public good.  So claims that a “time 
bomb” is ticking for Indonesia’s food security if rice imports are not reduced or banned 
altogether have raised concerns among the general population that the country is somehow losing 
ground in its long-term efforts to keep rice production growing faster than domestic demand.
1  
 
  Understandably, politicians reacted to these concerns, especially in the context of the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004.  For example, SiswonoYudhohusodo, former 
Minister of Cooperatives and the vice-presidential candidate who ran with Amien Rais on the 
PAN ticket in the 2004 Presidential election, has long championed very high import tariffs on 
rice, or even an outright ban on imports, as a way to return Indonesia to rice self-sufficiency.  
Rice farmers are perhaps the single largest identifiable voting bloc in Indonesia, so appealing to 
them is an obvious political strategy.  Middle class consumers often acquiesce in these 
approaches, and there is no question that rice self-sufficiency has a powerful political resonance 
throughout Asia.  Food security—articulated in the press as self-sufficiency in domestic rice 
production--remains a potent idea in Indonesia, where it is, as always, a political issue. 
                                                           
1  See the story in the Jakarta Post, May 4, 2002, where the “time bomb” issue was first raised.  For a discussion of 
actual trends in production and area harvested in Indonesia, see Peter Rosner, “Does Indonesia Face a Food Security 
Time Bomb?”  FPSA Working Paper, May 8, 2002, available at www.macrofoodpolicy.com.  
  2 
Lost in the recent debates has been any clear recognition that food security is primarily an 
economic issue, one on which a substantial analytical and empirical literature exists, for 
Indonesia and in general.
2  The universal conclusion from this literature is that only good 
economic policies can ensure food security on a sustainable basis for both the country as a whole 
and the millions of households individually.  From this economic perspective, the food security 
“time bomb” in Indonesia’s future is not potential reliance on rice imports ten years from now.  
Instead, the time bomb is poverty and the failure to restructure Indonesia’s economy in a way 




The Role of Rice Prices 
 
 
  The current political approach to stimulating productivity growth is through higher tariffs 
on imported rice, or an outright ban on imports.  However, the use of price policy to stimulate 
productivity growth is fraught with difficulties.  Indeed, the high level of rice prices in Indonesia 
makes the necessary economic restructuring quite difficult.  There is a great deal of confusion in 
the country about the level of rice prices.  Many government spokesmen, private research 
organizations, and all representatives of farmers complain about low rice prices.  Repeated and 
highly public efforts are made to keep cheap imported rice out of Indonesia—the Governor of 
East Java has repeatedly closed the port of Surabaya to ships carrying imported rice—an illegal 
act, but one which the Central Government has a difficult time overturning.  In fact, these efforts 
have succeeded far beyond their legal intent or mandate.  INPRES 9/2001 requires that rice 
import policies seek a balance between the needs of rice producers and rice consumers.
3  Figures 
1 and 2 show that despite this Presidential Instruction, rice prices in Indonesia are near historic 
high levels when compared with long-run trends in real (deflated) rupiahs (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 shows that real rice prices in Indonesia after the financial crisis were at least 30 
percent higher than their stable trend from 1975 to 1996, after the country recovered from the 
world food crisis and before the Asian financial crisis that saw the country lose control of the 
entire economy, not just rice prices.  During that 21-year period, real domestic rice prices were 
remarkably stable, although they did respond appropriately to local surpluses and deficits.  Rice 
prices almost doubled during the financial crisis, but by mid-2002 were down somewhat from 
that peak.  Since then they have increased again and remain far above the previous level that was 
regarded as “normal” for more than two decades.  As Figure 2 shows, the decline in real prices 
                                                           
 
2 This general literature is reviewed in C. Peter Timmer, "The Macro Dimensions of Food Security:  Economic 
Growth, Equitable Distribution, and Food Price Stability," Food Policy, vol. 25, no. 4 (August 2000), pp. 283-295, 
and in the Indonesian context in C. Peter Timmer, “The Meaning of Food Self-Sufficiency,” Indonesian Food 
Journal, vol. 5, no. 10, 1994, pp. 33-43. 
 
3 An INPRES, or Instruksi Presiden, is a formally issued order from the Indonesian President to all Executive 
Agencies to carry out specific tasks.  Under President Suharto, an INPRES had great influence although it did not 
have the formal authority of a law passed by the legislature.  Under recent governments, the INPRES mechanism 
has been somewhat less influential. 
  3after the crisis (where rice prices are now measured as the deflated floor price for dry paddy), 
was reversed in January, 2003.  Still, despite modest continuing declines in the real value of the 
official floor price because of inflation, by late in 2004 the entire structure of rice prices in 
Indonesia remained more than 30 percent higher in real terms than during the period of rice price 
stability from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.   
 


















































































































































































































































Nominal rice price from Bulog, deflated by the CPI 
(indeks harga konsumen) from BPS.
 
Source: The nominal price of rice is reported by Bulog (medium quality rice).  The CPI data are 
from BPS.  Figure from Peter Rosner. 
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  4Note: A long time series was not available for wet paddy (GKP) hence figure 2 shows the real value 
of the floor price for dry paddy (GKG) from 1973 to 2004.  Figure from Peter Rosner. 
  5Those “normal and stable” prices sought a balance between the interests of rice producers 
and consumers.  They were adequate to stimulate the increases in rice production in the 1980s 
that brought Indonesia to self sufficiency at the same time that rice consumption increased 
dramatically, especially among the poor.  This achievement, it should be recognized, was caused 
by a rice price stabilization policy, not by running up real prices to make rice farming more 
profitable.  Rice profitability came primarily from new technology, massive irrigation 
investments, and cheap fertilizer.  Stable, not high, rice prices gave farmers confidence to make 
the necessary investments to raise productivity.  Stable rice prices allowed consumers access to 
the additional rice produced. 
 
The situation at the start of the SBY government is totally different.  Even with the 
incentives provided by very high rice prices in historical terms, farmers cannot raise productivity 
of rice cultivation very much because they do not have new technology available.  Even higher 
rice prices will not generate that technology or raise productivity.  Higher rice prices in this 
environment produce a zero sum outcome—any increase in rice farmers’ incomes will be lost as 
rice consumers must pay higher prices.
4  There is no “spread effect” or multiplier without 
productivity gains; real wages will not be pulled up by extra demand from rice farmers—that 
demand is neutralized by the higher rice prices.  Consequently, the desirability of using higher 
rice prices to improve the incomes of rice farmers, and thus win their political allegiance, must 
be set against the losses to rice consumers, many of whom are quite poor.  The available 
evidence, reviewed below, suggests that the current political environment in Jakarta, which is 
pushing vigorously for higher rice prices, is heading Indonesian rice policy toward a disaster for 
the poor, who always bear the brunt of bad economics. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 put the Indonesian rice price in an international perspective.  Rice is a 
tradable commodity and Indonesia has been a substantial importer from world markets for the 
past half century, except for several years in the mid-1980s when self sufficiency was 
temporarily achieved.  Especially during the years when Bulog was successful in stabilizing 
domestic rice prices—from 1975 to 1996—a conscious effort was made to keep domestic rice 
prices on the long-run trend of world prices.  There were two reasons for this policy.  First, the 
world price represents the opportunity cost of rice to the Indonesian economy and economic 
efficiency requires that domestic and world prices track each other over extended periods of 
time.
5  Second, in the astute words of an early observer of Indonesian economics, “God meant 
Indonesia for free trade.”  Because of the country’s long and porous coastline, close to several 
major rice exporting ports, it is nearly impossible for Indonesia’s domestic rice price to be kept 
substantially above or below prices in those ports for extended periods of time. 
 
                                                           
4 In fact, when Indonesian rice prices are above world prices for extended periods of time, and there are no 
productivity gains, this is a negative sum game because of the efficiency losses from forgone gains to trade.  The 
circumstances when such price deviations create economic losses are discussed at length in C. Peter Timmer, 
Getting Prices Right: The Scope and Limits of Agricultural Price Policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 
(1986). 
 
5  There are no similar efficiency arguments for following world prices on a day-to-day basis.  See C. Peter Timmer, 
“Food Price Stabilization:  Rationale, Design, and Implementation,” in Perkins and Roemer, eds. Reforming 
Economic Systems in Developing Countries, Harvard University Press for HIID, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 





































































































































Note: The world price is the price of Thai 15 percent broken rice, f.o.b. Bangkok.  The domestic price is the 
price of medium quality rice reported by Bulog.  The domestic price is adjusted to the world price using a 
wholesale-retail markup of 10 percent, a $20 per ton charge for movement from Bangkok to the Jakarta 
wholesale market, and the average monthly exchange rate for the rupiah as reported by Bank Indonesia. 
Source: World price (Thai 15 percent broken f.o.b. Bangkok) from The Rice Trader.  Domestic price from 
Bulog.  Figure from Peter Rosner. 
 
 
From 2000 until early 2004, Indonesia’s rice prices were at very high levels compared with 
imports.  In the Jakarta market in mid-May, 2002, retail prices were twice as high as for 
comparable qualities of rice imported from India (when Indian prices were extremely low, as the 
Food Corporation of India sought to get rid of surplus stocks).
6  In March, 2004, the Minister of 
Trade and Industry placed a complete ban on rice imports “during the main rice harvest,” leaving 
it to the Minister of Agriculture to signal the end of the harvest.  No such signal had arrived by 
November, although the harvest had ended in May and world rice prices had increased by 25 
percent from their low point in 2003.  Despite the import ban, because of the run-up in prices in 
world rice markets in 2004, there is now near-parity between Indonesian rice prices and levels in 
world markets (Figure 4).  This fortuitous parity between domestic and world prices offers a 
short-run window of opportunity to restructure domestic rice price policy around more reliable 
interaction with the world market and fewer politically-driven market interventions. 
 
Whether because of import tariffs, seasonal bans on imports, or the risks of fluctuating 
currency rates and the clear antipathy of local governors to having imported rice in their 
provinces, Indonesia’s domestic rice price is high in real terms and, until just recently, was much 
higher than the world price.  As noted, current political rhetoric favors even higher rice prices.  
                                                           
 
6  See Peter Rosner, “Inpres 9/2001:  Balancing producer and consumer welfare,” FPSA Working Paper, May 23, 
2002. 
  7Indonesia’s political parties, just as those in the United States, Europe, and Japan, are competing 
for farmers’ support in the name of food security and higher incomes for family farms.  The costs 
of this competition are horrendous to consumers, taxpayers, or both.  The costs in the United 
States are foregone budget priorities.  With considerable blame also attributed to farm policies in 
Europe and Japan, a further result is badly distorted world markets for staple food commodities.  
Apart from the budget and consumer costs, Europe and Japan also incur a cost for their high farm 
prices through macroeconomic distortions and somewhat slower economic growth.  However, 
the farm sector in the United States is not large enough to have much macroeconomic impact, 
because GDP originating on farms in the U.S. was just 0.8 percent of total GDP in 2001.  The 
costs in Indonesia, unfortunately, are more tragic—more people in poverty, more hunger and 
malnutrition, and significantly slower economic growth with worse distribution. 
 









































































































































































































































































domestic wholesale price (IR64 class 
III)
world price (Viet 25% 
bk )
% gap (right axis)
 
  Note: The spread for medium quality rice is slightly higher but the trend is similar. 
The domestic price is the price of IR64 III rice in the Jakarta wholesale market (PIBC).  The world price is 
the price of Vietnamese 25% broken rice.  The f.o.b. world price has been adjusted to the Jakarta market by 
adding $20/ton for freight and insurance, multiplying by the exchange rate, and adding Rp 150/kg for the 
c.i.f. – wholesale markup.  Figure from Peter Rosner. 
 
 
These are serious arguments against Indonesia’s current approach to food security:  the 
political determination to force up the already high price of rice in domestic markets.  But most 
economists agree these will be the results of the policy approach recommended by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and by Bulog and its supporters in 
Parliament.  If the economics are so bad, why are higher rice prices so popular, at least in 
political circles and in the press?   
 
  8Three interconnected arguments are made to support higher prices.
7  First, subsidies to 
United States rice growers and exports cause lower world prices and make them “unfair;” 
second, an historically thin and unstable world rice market makes it risky to rely on imports for 
domestic food security; and third, a slowdown in the growth of Indonesian rice production has 
returned the country to importer status.  The link among the three arguments is the rice price, and 
this link is established through the following logic:  U.S. farm subsidies drive down the world 
price (with the U.S. intending to monopolize the world rice market according to some conspiracy 
theories, despite selling less than 10 percent of the rice traded in world markets), forcing Asian 
rice producers out of business by reducing profitability of growing rice, thus making the world 
market even more unreliable.  In this view, the response by Indonesia to such a strategy should 
be higher domestic rice prices, encouraging rice self-sufficiency and food security, to be 
implemented by isolating Indonesia’s rice market from the world market. 
 
The political appeal of these arguments is obvious, especially because there will be large 
profits to be made by Bulog in executing the strategy.  But the arguments are wrong on three 
counts.  First, they do not take account of the role of higher rice prices on the level of poverty in 
the country; second, they fail to recognize the full macroeconomic impact of high (and higher) 
rice prices on both the rate of economic growth and its distribution; and third, ironically, they fail 
to recognize the crucial role of international trade in rice in Indonesia’s own food security (and  
the trivial role that U.S. rice exports play in both).  These problems are taken up in turn. 
 
 
A.  Rice Prices and Poverty 
 
Rice is the most important commodity in Indonesia, especially for the poorest members 
of society.  It is not surprising that, in the short run, the level of rice prices is the single most 
important determinant of poverty at the household level.  The typical Indonesian household gets 
over half of its food energy from rice, and expends about ten percent of it income procuring it.  
Poor households allocate 20-25 percent of their total expenditures to rice. 
In the long run, rice prices also exert significant influence on the pace of poverty 
alleviation by conditioning the rate of economic growth.  This growth is the main cause of the 
structural transformation—the gradual decline of agriculture as a relative share of the economy 
and the relative growth of industry and modern services.  Sectoral contributions to economic 
growth and to the structural transformation, e.g. the role of agriculture, must be understood in the 
context of this long-run process of economic restructuring.  
In the short run, the effect of rice prices on the poverty of individual households hinges 
on the household’s status as a net buyer or seller of rice.  High prices clearly benefit net sellers of 
rice, and the larger are net sales the larger are the benefits.  Low prices benefit net buyers of rice, 
especially those who do not produce any rice at all.  This is the classic food price policy 
dilemma, and it is never a problem that is easily resolved.
8
                                                           
7  The underlying political economy of these arguments is discussed in the final section. 
 
8  This dilemma provided the integrating analytical theme for Food Policy Analysis, by Timmer, Falcon and Pearson 
(1983), Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 
  9Urban dwellers are net buyers of rice.  This group includes the wealthiest members of 
society, but wealthy households are only a small fraction of urban households.  In addition to the 
urban middle class, there are large numbers of urban poor.  Rice accounts for a substantial 
portion of total expenditures of these poor households.  In normal times (pre-crisis), rice 
constitutes 20 percent of total expenditures for the poorest quarter of urban households.  For the 
poorest 5 percent, this share rises to 25 percent (and it was even higher at the peak of the crisis).
9
The share of the population living in urban areas is also growing over time, another 
manifestation of the structural transformation.  During the 1990s, the level of the rural population 
was virtually stagnant, but the urban population grew at a rate of about 4.5 percent per year.  
Because of this differential population growth, the share of the poor that reside in urban areas is 
growing over time as well. 
 
Although the relative importance of the urban poor is growing, the majority of the poor 
resides in rural areas and will for a long time to come.  In rural areas, the most important 
productive asset is land, and land ownership is a key determinant of both wealth and whether any 
particular household is a net buyer or seller of rice.  On Java, 45 percent of all rural households 
do not own any land other than perhaps a house plot.  While not all of these households are poor, 
the great majority of them are in the lower rungs of the income distribution.  Another 20 percent 
own less than one-quarter hectare of land, which is just enough to provide the average per capita 
consumption of rice for a family of five (if all the land is planted to rice and not to other crops).  
Together, these two groups account for nearly two-thirds of rural households on Java.  By and 
large, they are much poorer than farmers with larger amounts of land, and they are not likely to 
be net sellers of rice.  For these households, lower rice prices mean higher real incomes and less 
poverty.   
 
Indonesia’s larger landowning rice farmers are not wealthy in absolute terms, but in 
relative terms most of these households fall in the middle (third) quintile of the overall income 
distribution.  On Java, only one-third of rural households own enough land to produce a surplus 
of rice for a family of five.  These are clearly not the poorest of the poor.  In fact, the image of 
abject poverty is of someone without enough food to eat.  Almost by definition, this is not a 
farmer with enough land to sell a surplus of rice to the market.   
 
It is also important to realize that, on average, land-owning, rice-surplus farmers generate 
only about half of their family income from growing rice.  A decline in rice-based income does 
not lead to a proportional decline in household welfare even for these households.  Indeed, their 
welfare depends equally on a dynamic non-rice rural economy.  In summary, when urban 
households are included, only about 20-25 percent of Indonesia’s households are even 
marginally better off from higher rice prices, and very few of these are among Indonesia’s truly 
poor.  High rice prices hurt the poor.
10
                                                           
 
9 The 2002 SUSENAS shows that perhaps ten percent of urban households are net producers of foods (not restricted 
to rice).  The data do not indicate whether these are urban-based landlords, or short-distance commuting farmers. 
 
10 There is also evidence that high rice prices during the financial crisis in 1998 caused serious micro-nutrient 
deficiencies among small children in Central Java.  See Steven A. Block, et al., “Macro Shocks and Micro 
Outcomes:  Child Nutrition during Indonesia’s Crisis,” Economics and Human Biology, Vol. 2, 2004, pp. 21-44. 
  10 
Perhaps the clearest evidence linking rice prices and the poor relates to the distributional 
impact of economic growth.  Table 1 shows the “growth elasticity of poverty (GEP),” i.e. the 
percentage decline in the headcount index of poverty relative to the percentage change in overall 
incomes per capita, for various episodes (for which SUSENAS data are available) from 1967 to 
2002.  This elasticity is always negative—economic growth leads to reductions in poverty (and 
vice versa)—but it varies widely in magnitude, from -0.81 to -3.29.  This variance is largely 
caused by changes in real rice prices.  When rice prices are rising, economic growth has less 
impact on the poor than otherwise, and when rice prices are falling, the poor benefit. 
 
B.  Rice Prices and Economic Growth 
 
Rice prices are important for poverty alleviation not only in terms of their short-term 
direct effects on the poorest segments of the population.  In addition, rice prices play a key role 
in the structural transformation, both within the agricultural sector and for the economy as a 
whole.  Within the agricultural sector, lower rice prices encourage rice farmers to diversify their 
cropping pattern by making rice less profitable to grow and by making it cheaper for farmers 
who diversify into other activities to buy rice from the market.   
 
These ex-rice farmers then begin to produce other crops such as fruits and vegetables, 
which are more profitable, but also allow consumers to diversify their diets and increase their 
intake of proteins, vitamins, and minerals, which are crucial for the reduction of malnutrition.  
This is a slow process under the best of circumstances and must be market driven.  Appropriate 
government support for research, extension, and marketing initiatives can also speed the process.  
Supporting highly protected prices for rice slows it down.  
 
Crop diversification is occurring to some extent in Indonesia, although not very rapidly.  
In 1984, when Indonesia temporarily achieved self-sufficiency in rice, 41 percent of all cropped 
area was planted to rice.  The share is still about 35 percent, a relatively small change over a 
period of 20 years of significant economic growth (despite the financial crisis).  By contrast, rice 
as a share of total cropped area in Malaysia declined from 25 percent in 1972 to 13 percent in 
1998.  Artificially high (and stable) rice prices have impeded the diversification process 
unnecessarily in Indonesia.  Lower rice prices can speed it along by guaranteeing reliable and 
affordable supplies of rice in rural markets to farm households who chose to diversify or invest 
in nonfarm rural activities. 
 
The rural market reforms in China after 1978 provide a lesson in the role of local food 
availability in supporting decisions by local entrepreneurs to diversify out of grain production. 
One of the most important policies to support development of small scale rural industries in 
China was the freeing of food grain markets in rural areas in the early 1980s.  This impact has 
not been lost on the Chinese leadership, which has committed itself to keeping domestic grain 
prices in line with world prices as part of their entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
Their argument is that low grain prices will maintain China’s competitive advantage in labor-
intensive manufactures and encourage Chinese farmers to seek more profitable crop and 
livestock activities as a way out of the trap of low incomes from grain production.   
 
  11  Table 1.  Factors Affecting Changes in the Headcount Index of Poverty 
 
    Annual %  Annual %     Growth    Annual % 
change in per  change in     Elasticity  change in real 
    capita income  poverty index    of Poverty  rice prices 
 
1967-76      5.48       -6.0        -1.09         2.5 
1976-80     6.37       -8.1        -1.27     -3.5 
1980-84      4.23       -6.8        -1.61        3.0 
1984-87      2.69       -7.0        -2.60       -2.5 
1987-90      5.66       -4.6        -0.81         5.5 
1990-93      5.41       -4.6        -0.85       -1.6 
1993-96      5.23       -6.2        -1.19          5.8 
1996-99     -3.25        9.9         -3.05 (+)   19.2 
1999-2002   2.49       -8.2        -3.29        -7.1 
 
Note:  The Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) is calculated as the ratio of the percentage reduction in the headcount 
poverty index relative to the percentage change in per capita incomes (in $PPP) from the World Bank Data Base on 
Pro-Poor Growth.  An OLS regression of GEP on the change in the real rice price (DRRP) explains 80 percent of the 
variance in GEP, with highly significant coefficients.  The results are as follows (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
GEP  =    -1.57  +    0.209  DRRP      R-squared  =    0.8325   Eq.  1 
 (5.8)  (5.9)       Adj.  R-squared=  0.8086    
 
Alternatively, changes in per capita incomes (DPCI) and in real rice prices can both be used to explain changes in 
the poverty index (DPI).  This specification has the following results: 
 
DPI =  -2.42   -0.853 DPCY  +  0.445 DRRP      R-squared=  0.9108    Eq. 2 
 (1.68)  (2.93)   (3.95)     Adj.  R-squared=  0.8811 
 
Equations 1 and 2 are telling somewhat different stories.  In Equation 1, the GEP is constructed by dividing DPI by 
DPCY, and then the variance in this ratio is related to changes in the rice price (DRRP).  The coefficient is 0.209, 
indicating that for every 1.0 percent movement in real rice prices, the GEP moves 0.2 points.  When rice prices are 
unchanged, the intercept term in Equation 1 says that the PEG is -1.57, a relatively large number in absolute terms. 
 
By contrast, Equation 2 relaxes the restriction that it is the ratio of DPI to DPCY that is the relevant variable to 
explain, and focuses instead on changes in the poverty index directly.  Statistically, this costs an extra degree of 
freedom in the estimation, not trivial with only 9 observations, but the results are very illuminating nonetheless.  The 
coefficient on DPCY is only -0.853 (instead of the 1.000 implied in the ratio specification), and the coefficient on 
changes in the real rice price more than doubles, to 0.445.  In the unconstrained model, rice prices are twice as 
important to conditioning the rate of poverty reduction as they are in the GEP model, and economic growth becomes 
somewhat less of a driver.  However, the intercept term in Equation 2 of  -2.42 suggests that even when changes in 
per capita incomes and real rice prices are both kept constant (or are even zero), poverty falls by over two 
percentage points per year.  This is not a statistically robust result, as the intercept is significant at only the 85 
percent confidence level. 
 
When the intercept term is constrained to be zero (thus assuming there is no exogenous trend in poverty reduction), 
the result is something of a blend between Equations 1 and 2, as Equation 3 indicates: 
 
DPI  =  -1.285  DPCY    +  0.3205  DRRP     R-squared=  0.9258   Eq.  3 
 (8.37)   (3.36)      Adj.  R-squared=  0.9045 
 
  12 The lessons for Indonesia from China’s WTO commitments are twofold:  first, lower 
rice prices can stimulate small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia as well, and also 
provide reliable food supplies for farmers who wish to diversify.  But second, and far more 
important for the long run, Indonesia’s very competitiveness in international trade will be 
challenged by the Chinese strategy unless Indonesia also keeps the cost of its main wage good 
close to international levels. 
 
This potential impact on the profitability of investments in labor-intensive enterprises 
means that rice prices play a key role in the structural transformation of the broader economy.  
Low rice prices allow real wages to be higher for employees without any increase in the nominal 
wages paid by employers in the high-productivity industrial and service sectors of the economy.  
In conjunction with other factors, this combination of low nominal wages and high real wages 
stimulates the job creation and economic growth that are necessary for sustainable poverty 
alleviation.  Excessively high rice prices mean workers need higher wages to keep their real 
incomes from falling, as has happened in the Philippines, where domestic rice prices have been 
well above world market prices for the past 15 years.  These needs of workers are entirely 
legitimate, but their higher nominal wages discourage investment, both domestic and foreign.  
The end result is a slowdown of the productivity growth that is essential for poverty alleviation. 
 
If there are so many benefits to low rice prices, why not drive prices well below market 
levels to create even more of these positive effects?  Artificially low food prices have been tried 
as a development strategy in many countries, for example in Egypt with highly subsidized bread, 
China before 1978, with cheap rice and wheat, and the former Soviet Union, also with cheap 
bread, but they have always failed.  Such a strategy reduces farmers’ incentives to produce at the 
country’s opportunity costs, hindering long-term productivity growth in the agricultural sector.  
Perhaps as important, a strategy of artificially low food prices requires subsidies and results in 
substantial fiscal costs to the government.  These costs then divert scarce government resources 
from being used to provide the public goods necessary to create a dynamic rural economy, such 
as roads, education, and agricultural research.  There are also efficiency losses to keeping 
domestic prices substantially below the trend in world prices because of the misallocation of 
resources. 
 
What is the optimal level of rice prices?  In a world of perfect information and 
competitive markets, the answer is “the world price.”  In the less-than-perfect world that rice 
importing countries live in, research has shown that keeping domestic rice prices above world 
prices by perhaps 10 percent may be optimal. This margin ensures that the multiplier effects 
from increased agricultural incomes are realized, while minimizing the impact on poverty in the 
short run.  However, any large, sustained deviation of domestic prices from world prices in 
either direction will lead to substantially sub-optimal outcomes and slow the rate of economic 
growth.  
 
C.  Rice Prices and Food Security 
 
Indonesia’s rice economy is now mid-way in a painful transition.  It started as a sector 
heavily regulated by a centralized Ministry of Agriculture and stabilized by a well-financed food 
logistics agency (Bulog).  It is striving to become an open, market-oriented sector which depends 
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stalled, however, because of the policy-induced disconnect between the domestic and world rice 
economies that emerged after the financial crisis in 1997 and which has remained as the main 
pillar of domestic rice policy since then.  This is not a market-oriented rice economy. 
 
The key question at this juncture is how to complete the transition to such a rice economy 
while recognizing the constraints on policy initiatives that face the government.  These 
constraints are mostly political, although the lack of new rice technology certainly narrows the 
degrees of freedom for policy makers.  But policy makers seem to think that rice farmers need 
higher prices to stimulate production, and hence to improve Indonesia’s food security.  This 
perception is based on a faulty understanding of Indonesia’s earlier success in stimulating rice 
production and improving the country’s food security.  Thus it is worth reviewing briefly how 
rice prices were set during the New Order government, when they were stabilized and 
maintained on the long-run trend in world market prices, until the financial crisis.  It is also 
necessary to explain why the policies that achieved these desirable outcomes are no longer 
appropriate. 
 
In summary, between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s, Bulog defended a floor price and 
a ceiling price through a combination of the following four policy instruments:  first, monopoly 
control over international trade in rice; second, access to an unlimited line of credit (at heavily 
subsidized interest rates in the early years and at commercial rates with a Bank Indonesia 
guarantee in the later years); third, procurement of as much rice as necessary by Dologs to lift the 
price in rural markets to the policy-determined floor price; and fourth, extensive logistical 
facilities, including a nation-wide complex of warehouses, which permitted seasonal storage of 
substantial quantities of rice (including the one million tons for the “iron stock” that was 
considered essential for Indonesia’s food security).  These rice stocks, accumulated through 
domestic procurement in defense of the floor price and, when these supplies were inadequate, 
through imports, were then used to defend a ceiling price in urban markets.  In the early years, 
the ceiling price was explicit and announced publicly; in the later years, it was informal, 
providing local Dolog officials more flexibility in maintaining stability of rice prices.
11
 
This was a heavily interventionist approach to formation of rice prices in Indonesia, and 
thus to the country’s food security.  Still, few observers doubted the need for such intervention in 
the late 1960s and through the period of instability in the world rice market in the 1970s.  An 
econometric assessment of the 25-year period from 1970 to 1995 concluded that Bulog’s 
stabilization efforts paid very high dividends in fostering faster economic growth during Repelita 
I and II [the first two five-year plans, from 1969 to 1979], apart from the additional benefits 
provided by enhanced political stability.  But even this positive assessment concluded that 
benefits from this market intervention were diminishing as rice became a much smaller 
proportion of the value added in the economy and as a share of consumers’ budgets.  By the mid-
1990s there was clearly a need to design a much more market-oriented price policy.
12
                                                           
11  The details of this story are contained in C. Peter Timmer, “Food Security in an Era of Decentralization:  
Historical Lessons and Policy Implications for Indonesia.”  This paper is part of the output from the Food Policy 
Support Activity (FPSA) and is available at the project website:  www.macrofoodpolicy.com. 
 
12 See C. Peter Timmer, “Does Bulog Stabilize Rice Prices?  Should It Try?”  Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (August 1996), pp. 45-74. 
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price stabilization program was very expensive in budgetary terms, because heavy subsidies had 
to be provided to Bulog to maintain large stocks, subsidize exports when surpluses accumulated, 
and subsidize imports when domestic supplies were short.  The increased corruption in the 
agency in the mid-1990s further called in question the use of public funds to support the price 
stabilization role. 
   
Second, successful stabilization of rice prices enhanced the profitability of growing rice 
and biased farmer decision making toward its cultivation.  This bias was desirable at the time as 
new rice technology and extensive investment in rural infrastructure, especially irrigation, meant 
farmers had to learn how to manage a radically new way of growing rice.  In addition, Indonesia 
was exposed to a very thin and unstable world rice market in the 1970s and additional domestic 
rice production enhanced its food security.  But as early as the 1980s, the bias toward rice 
production was causing serious difficulties in diversifying Indonesia’s agriculture toward higher- 
value crop and livestock systems.
13  
 
A long-run decline in the price of rice in world markets, and significantly greater stability 
in world prices, have now sharply lowered the opportunity cost of rice to the Indonesian 
economy.  In 1998, for example, the country was able to import over 6 million metric tons of rice 
in the wake of the worst drought in recent history—caused by a historically severe el Nino—with 
very little impact on the world rice market (see Figure 3).  With Indonesian rice imports 
returning to the “normal” levels of earlier years after 1998, world prices continued their long-
term decline.
14  Indeed, the decline through 2003 was so severe that even the recent 25 percent 
run-up of prices from major exporters in Asia only brought them back to their 10-year downward 
trend. In the face of these long-run opportunity costs of growing rice, farmers will need to 
diversify out of rice to have better income-earning prospects in the future.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, the smallest farmers will need to get out of rice growing to ensure their food 
security. 
 
Alternatives to the high-cost and inefficient approach to rice price policy in the 1980s and 
early 1990s—and to the country’s food security--were already under discussion in the mid-
1990s.  Although various analysts had differing priorities for reform, the core ideas were similar.  
Indonesia should rely much more heavily on rice imports for its food security, including taking 
the lead in forming a free trade zone for rice in East and Southeast Asia (possibly to include 
Bangladesh and India as well).  Substantial investments in rural infrastructure to improve 
efficiency of rice marketing would be needed so that traders and farmers would buy and store 
nearly all of the harvest.  Continued development of rural capital markets would also be needed 
to ensure that the financial liquidity traditionally provided by Bulog procurement in defense of 
                                                           
13 See C. Peter Timmer, "Crop Diversification in Rice-Based Agricultural Economies:  Conceptual and Policy 
Issues" in Ray A. Goldberg, ed., Research in Domestic and International Agribusiness Management, vol. 8.  
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 95-163. 
 
14 See David Dawe, “The Future of the World Rice Market and Policy Options to Counteract Price Instability in 
Indonesia,” FPSA Working Paper No. 3, and David Dawe, “The Changing Structure of the World Rice Market, 
1950-2000,”  IRRI Los Banos, 2002. 
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and traders.
15   
 
Greater variability in seasonal prices would be permitted so that these farmers and 
traders could earn adequate returns on their investments.  Such variability would not be a 
problem for most consumers because rice has declined to a small and manageable share of their 
budget expenditures.  In case of large increases in rice prices in world markets (much less likely 
with a large Asian free trade zone) or localized shortages, subsidies to poor consumers could be 
targeted through special logistical efforts (Bulog had already experimented with such a program 
during the drought in 1991—the pilot activity was called “Special Market Operations,” OPK, 
which is also the name of a similar program used during (and since) the financial crisis to target 
cheap rice to poor consumers, still with Bulog as the implementing agency).  Variable tariffs on 
rice imports were also discussed as a mechanism for stabilizing rice prices in Indonesia without 
the need for a costly logistical agency. 
 
These discussions about improving the efficiency of the rice economy were put on hold 
during the financial crisis, although both the IMF and the World Bank pushed for liberalization 
of rice trade and a cutback in Bulog activities as part of their support programs.  Indeed, it is 
these donor efforts that have pushed Indonesia into the transition that is currently underway, and 
it is clear the donors would prefer to see the process completed as rapidly as possible.   
 
There is substantial merit to the market-oriented rice economy seen at the end of this 
transition, and it remains a highly desirable goal, both for its effect on efficiency in the 
agricultural sector and the sustainability of the country’s food security.  But there are also 
substantial political barriers in the way of this outcome.  One worrisome element of the current 
policy debate is that there seems to be little understanding of how the previous rice price policy 
was designed and implemented as the core component of the country’s approach to food 
security, what its true costs were, and what the implications might be for price stabilization if  
Bulog, already converted into a commercially-oriented state enterprise, is given monopoly 
control over rice imports.  Thus the political discussions are being conducted in a near vacuum of 
institutional memory and experience with policy design and implementation.  
 
The concern, of course, is that a failure to understand how the country managed its food 
security successfully under the Suharto government may leave Indonesia’s new political 
leadership unprepared to cope with existing challenges, much less new ones.  The main existing 
challenge to food security is not primarily focused on the food dimensions:  agricultural 
productivity, unreliable import supplies, or local food shortages.  Instead, the current challenge, 
and almost certainly the most pressing challenge for the next decade, will be to re-establish 
rapid, pro-poor growth in the context of renewed structural transformation.
16  Continued or 
worsening poverty is Indonesia’s main food security concern, but a rapidly changing food system 
will also be an increasing challenge. 
                                                           
15   See C. Peter Timmer, “Building Efficiency in Agricultural Marketing:  The Long-run Role of Bulog in the 
Indonesian Food Economy,” Journal of International Development, vol. 9, no. 1 (1997), pp. 133-45. 
 
16  See C. Peter Timmer, “The Road to Pro-Poor Growth:  Indonesia in Regional Perspective,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 40, no. 2 (August, 2004), pp. 173-203. 
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In particular, a “supermarket revolution” is altering the nature of Indonesia’s food supply 
chain—from farmers to retail consumers.  Although most of the attention so far to this revolution 
has been about helping small farmers join the supermarket supply chains, a consumer perspective 
is needed as well.  Farmers produce food (to make a living), the marketing chain, ending with 
supermarkets in some cases, processes food and delivers it to consumers (to make a profit), but 
the overall welfare of a society is determined by the outcomes for consumers (i.e. by their 
standards of living, including their sense of food security).  
 
To understand the impact of the supermarket revolution on food security, the key 
question is, who gains and who loses from the revolution?  To answer this question, an 
economist will ask, what are the scarce resources, and who controls them, because scarcity has 
value?
17  There are three basic possibilities for what resource is scarcest in the food system:  
access to farm output; access to marketing technology; or access to consumers.   
 
First, despite concerns that population growth will outstrip growth in food supplies, the 
historical evidence is that the capacity to produce basic food commodities is not scarce on a 
global level.  Modern agricultural technology is land-saving, there is abundant rural labor (again, 
on a global level), rural finance is readily available when there is a profit to be made in lending 
it, and water is becoming scarce only because it is provided free in most cases.  What might be 
scarce at the farm level is the management ability to meet high quality standards and to deliver 
reliably a safe product that meets environmental requirements and is fully traceable to its point of 
production.  There are likely to be significant economies of scale to this management ability, 
even if there are few scale economies in the physical production of most agricultural 
commodities, especially those requiring close monitoring such as fresh fruits and vegetables, and 
many livestock products. 
 
A second possibility for what is scarce is access to marketing and information technology 
that improves coordination.
18  The technology for managing supply chains—in the food system 
and elsewhere—is changing rapidly, even in the United States.  This technology is changing 
especially rapidly in the modern logistics area that uses information technology to manage 
inventories.  In general, these technologies drive down transactions costs throughout the supply 
chain.  But further, by reducing the need to hold large inventories, these marketing and logistics 
technologies reduce capital costs and risks.  Since inventory is basically a form of “dead capital,” 
                                                           
 
17 This is a particularly economic view of the world, where something has a “value in exchange” that can be 
completely different from its “value in use.”  Diamonds, for example, are at one end of the spectrum (high value in 
exchange but limited value in use, and air is at the other (high value in use, but low value in exchange).  Food 
commodities are typically in the middle of this spectrum, but the contradiction between a constantly high “value in 
use” for food and its sharply fluctuating “value in exchange” have caused some analysts to argue that individual 
access to food is an “entitlement” or “basic human right” that should be divorced from market access.  However, no 
one has figured out how to do this. 
 
18  The food marketing system is the “narrow point in the funnel” between many farmers and many consumers.  
Because there are relatively few of them, the “middleman” is universally subject to the charge of exploiting both 
ends of the food chain.   
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transactions costs.  And both contribute to higher productivity and faster economic growth. 
 
The important question is whether access to this technology is sufficiently restricted that 
it is “scarce,” i.e. can excess profits be earned by controlling it?  The evidence suggests that it is 
easily duplicated as computer power becomes cheaper and local managers learn to imitate the 
market leaders.  Intellectual property rights (IPR) seem not to be a serious impediment to this 
imitation, despite supermarket chains’ efforts at proprietary control.  It is the knowledge that such 
techniques are feasible and available that is important, not the specific code written for a 
particular supermarket’s computers.  The parallel to the “technological treadmill” so familiar to 
American farmers is striking.  First adopters of new technology have a temporary cost advantage, 
but competition leads all market players to adopt it quickly.  This seems to be the story for 
marketing technology. 
 
The third possibility for what is scarce is access to consumers themselves, and especially 
to knowledge of how consumers behave—what they want, and therefore, how best to serve them.  
As concentration in food retailing rises, there seems to be an opportunity for the leading firms—
Carrefour, Wal-Mart, Metro, Tesco, etc.—to control this access and thus to earn higher 
marketing margins and profits.  This has been a longstanding worry in the United States, at least 
since the 1940s.  The evidence so far, both in rich and poor countries alike, is that access to 
consumers has been very competitive.  Market power is used to drive down costs, and these 
lower costs are then passed along to consumers as lower prices.  Why lower prices instead of 
higher profits?  Because supermarkets need to increase market share to achieve the economies of 
scale that permit their costs to be even lower.  So far, this whole process has been highly 
contestable.  Economists know that contestable markets pass nearly all the benefits of the 
marketplace (the sum of producer and consumer surplus, to be technical) through to consumers.
19  
Thus the main winners in the supermarket revolution are consumers. 
 
This analysis and the conclusions stemming from it have powerful implications for what 
policy recommendations make sense from a welfare perspective, including a public concern for 
food security.  There are four key areas to consider:  (1) consumers and public health; (2) the role 
of and impact on small farmers; (3) food security per se at the local and national level; and (4) 
how the supermarket revolution fits into the long-run structural transformation of a society. 
 
As consumers become more urbanized and divorced from the production of their food, 
the vast array of choices in modern supermarkets can, paradoxically, lead to worsened nutritional 
status.  The “double burden” of malnutrition, with under-nutrition existing side-by-side with 
obesity and diet-related problems such as heart disease and diabetes, is already facing Indonesia 
and many other developing countries.  The policy options for responding to this problem are 
limited, but one approach is to use the “focusing power” of supermarkets to provide nutrition 
education to their shoppers.  Nutritional labeling is one component of this education, but 
                                                           
 
19  Even at this late stage in the supermarket revolution in the United States, adoption of state-of-the-art marketing 
technology generates annual benefits equal to the size of the entire farm economy!  This is a staggering result, 
driven by the calculation that Wal-Mart alone, the leader in the marketing technology revolution, lowers the annual 
inflation rate by roughly one percent per year, and value added from agriculture is only 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP. 
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dietary patterns in healthier directions.  This is a “micro” approach to food security 
 
Small farmers are obviously a second focal point of concern, both for their own food 
security and their contribution to a country’s food supplies.  The evidence so far from other 
countries, especially Latin America, is that small farmers tend to be squeezed out of supermarket 
supply chains fairly rapidly because of the high transactions costs of dealing with them.  This is 
not likely to be an optimal response in Indonesia, but the question is what policy makers can do 
to help small farmers without raising costs and hurting consumers.  Providing useful technical 
assistance to farmers, serving as a “catalyst” for the formation of farmer associations, and 
conducting research, extension and training activities—increasingly as joint ventures with 
private sector participants—would seem to be promising activities.
20
 
Third, in a large, densely populated society where half the average daily food energy still 
comes from rice, how will food security be managed when most of this rice is sold in 
supermarkets?  In the past, as discussed in the historical section on Indonesia’s approach, 
managing food security at the national level has meant guaranteeing availability of rice in local 
markets, and keeping the price of rice reasonably stable.  Can supermarkets take over these 
tasks?  Price stabilization has traditionally been a public sector role because there is no private 
market where producers and consumers can “purchase” price stability.  But if food sales become 
sufficiently concentrated in a few dominant supermarket chains, it is entirely possible that 
consumer demands for price stability of rice could be “internalized” and provided, profitably, by 
these private sector players.   
 
Finally, as argued above, much of the concern for food security is actually a concern for 
poverty.  There is a serious concern that the rapid spread of supermarkets might actually make 
rural poverty worse.  It is very important to remember, however, that rural poverty cannot be 
solved by keeping all of Indonesia’s small farmers on their farms, whether or not they are 
supplying supermarkets.  To solve the problem of rural poverty the entire economy must grow 
rapidly again, jobs must be created off the farm, and Indonesia must continue on its path of 
structural transformation.  Supermarkets are only a small part of this transformation, but by 
pushing competitive pressures from consumers downward throughout the food system, they can 
play a surprisingly important role in improving productivity, and consumer welfare, for the 
economy. 
 
                                                           
20 Experience with supermarket development in China shows the usefulness of these approaches.  See Dinghuan Hu, 
Thomas Reardon, Scott Rozelle, Peter Timmer and Honglin Wang, “The Emergence of Supermarkets with Chinese 
Characteristics:  Challenges and Opportunities for China’s Agricultural Development,” Development Policy Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 5 (2004), pp. 557-586. 
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The political economy of dealing with poverty and rapid changes in the food system is 
troublesome as Indonesia’s new democratic institutions try to work out effective mechanisms for 
economic governance.  Again, a historical perspective is helpful.  There are three basic strategic 
approaches to reducing poverty, and over its long history, Indonesia has tried all three.  Under 
Sukarno, most attention was on redistributive measures, including efforts at a land reform in 
1955.  The focus shifted under Suharto to active implementation of pro-poor growth strategies 
as, in the famous words of one of the economic technocrats who came to power in the late 1960s, 
“there is nothing to re-distribute; we have to make the pie bigger.”  Under the recent democratic 
governments (plural), most of the effort to help the poor has been through direct fiscal transfers 
involving more-or-less targeted distribution of rice, school vouchers, and cards granting access to 
health facilities. 
 
Only the pro-poor growth strategy has shown any capacity for sustained progress in 
reducing poverty—and thus enhancing food security--so the immediate issue is to understand the 
political economy of that strategy, both in the Suharto era and for the future political context of 
modern Indonesia.  Political scientists speculate on the nature of the political coalition assembled 
by Suharto to maintain and strengthen his hold on power.  This coalition was clearly held 
together by distribution of economic resources, often in the form of lucrative access to easily 
marketable commodities such as oil or timber (i.e. to the rents from “point-source” natural 
resources).  Indonesia had the potential to experience the “natural resource curse” in an acute 
manner, but avoided the worst manifestations until the mid-1990s. 
 
Import licenses for rice, wheat, sugar and soybeans were equally lucrative and were 
controlled closely by Bulog in the interests of the Suharto regime.  Whether the pro-poor 
policies, and results, of the regime were tied to keeping these interest groups satisfied, even at 
the expense of faster economic growth in the short run, is the subject of active debate, especially 
because Bulog, despite being “privatized,” established close ties with the husband of President 
Megawati and is lobbying aggressively for renewal of its monopoly control over trade in most 
agricultural commodities.  The ability of Bulog to stall the deregulation process in the early 
1990s is seen by some observers as an early signal that the entire growth process was running off 
the rails into corrupt and distortionary cronyism.  From this perspective, the collapse of the 
formal sector during the Asian Financial Crisis was not such a surprise, as it had become 
increasingly dominated by these interests. 
 
The most debated political economy aspect of the New Order government was the near 
schizophrenia between macro and sectoral policies.  What is so puzzling is why macro economic 
policy was left largely in the hands of very talented, but highly apolitical, technocrats.  
Persuasive arguments are made that they provided access to the donor community, which has 
been a strong, almost lavish, supporter of Indonesia since the late 1960s.  On the other hand, 
trade policy protected special interests in the Suharto circle and even beyond, sometimes with no 
more apparent rationale than a nationalist interest to develop a modern industrial capacity.  The 
role of good economic governance and political commitment to poverty reduction is a key lesson 
from this experience, but the paradox is why the autocratic Suharto regime provided both 
ingredients for so long, and why the new democratic governments have not.   
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There is speculation that part of Suharto’s commitment came from the highly visible 
politics, and power, of food security.  The drive for higher agricultural productivity—a key 
ingredient in pro-poor growth--was fueled at least in part by the desire for households, and the 
country, to have more reliable supplies of rice than what was available, at least historically, from 
world markets.  Here too the world has changed, and a drive for rice self-sufficiency that made 
technical and economic sense in the early 1980s would be folly today, a reality that has not yet 
registered with the current government. 
 
Despite the apparent perversity of current political economy with respect to pro-poor 
growth, and the role of the rice economy in generating that growth, there is a rationale that 
explains it.  Behind the Suharto regime’s commitment to pro-poor growth were two important 
constituencies, one backing economic growth itself, and the other expressing concern for the 
poor.  The growth coalition was made up of the modernizing elements of the military, the 
business elite not already comfortably protected by anti-growth protectionist measures, and most 
of the rural sector, which was near starvation in the mid-1960s. 
 
The voices for the poor included many of this same coalition, but for quite different 
reasons.  The military was concerned about rural unrest and did not have the coercive resources 
to suppress it by force alone.  The Jakarta political elite, led by President Suharto, increasingly 
staked their credibility on political stability, and both the urban and rural poor could threaten 
that, as the 1974 Malari riots demonstrated.  And increasingly the donor community came to 
stress the importance of poverty reduction, as was manifested in the major commitment by the 
World Bank to the analytical work that surfaced in its 1990 report on poverty.  
 
Thus the fortuitous intersection of the growth and poverty coalitions offered the Suharto 
regime a clear political opportunity to do well by doing good.  In the context of powerful 
opportunities to stimulate rapid growth in rural areas through high-payoff investments in 
rehabilitating irrigation systems and rural infrastructure and the importation of new rice 
technologies, a cumulative process started that built both rapid growth and poverty reduction into 
the basic dynamics of the Indonesian economy. 
 
This cumulative process seemed to have ended in the early 1980s, as prices for 
agricultural commodities collapsed in world markets, oil prices declined, and the whole growth 
process seemed threatened.  Fortuitously, again, but under the determined guidance of the 
technocrats, the economy was restructured to make it more open to foreign trade and investment, 
just as Japan and Korea came looking for opportunities to invest in labor-intensive 
manufacturing facilities.  Only with the economic and political collapse in 1998 did this source 
of pro-poor growth disappear. 
 
What next?  The political appeal of the new strategy for dealing with poverty—direct 
fiscal transfers to the poor—is obvious.  These transfers have immediate and visible impact on 
the recipients, and the political “pitch” for the programs makes it sound as though the 
government is actively committed to poverty reduction. Thus although democracy has probably 
increased the size and influence of the political coalition concerned about poverty, it has sharply 
undermined the coalition supporting economic growth as the main mechanism for dealing with 
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fact, Bulog seems to have built a political coalition similar to the one supporting Food Stamps in 
the U.S. Congress, where support comes from conservative rural legislators eager to have 
additional markets for the food that is produced in surplus by their farm constituents, and from 
urban liberals who have many poor people who use food stamps as a major source of their 
income.  Similarly, Bulog has assembled support for its rice procurement program (ostensibly to 
help rice farmers), which supplies the rice for the OPK program that delivers subsidized rice to 
the poor.  As Stephen Mink of the World Bank has observed, no parliamentarians have been 
willing to take on both dimensions of the rice program simultaneously, and so the huge budget 
subsidies that accrue to Bulog to run these programs, and the corruption that accompanies them, 
go unchallenged. 
 
Rebuilding the economic growth coalition is likely to take a long time, as it will depend 
on the underlying conditions of economic governance—political stability, rule of law, control of 
corruption, and so on—that are still moving in the wrong direction.  Probably the best that can be 
done in the short run—the next 3 to 5 years—is to minimize policy damage to the interests of the 
poor while trying to improve the effectiveness of the programs transferring resources directly to 
the poor.  But in the long run, the only way to sustain food security is through pro-poor 
economic growth. 
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